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Abstract
This paper examines the way monetary policy has been conducted recently in the seven
largest Latin American economies, the LAC-7 group. We run eight alternative speciﬁcations
for the Taylor rule and select the most appropriate functional form through out-of-sample
measures of forecasting performance. The comparison indicates that backward-looking
rules slightly outperform forward-looking ones in forecasting interest rates, hinting that
past inﬂation is still an important determinant of expected inﬂa t i o ni ne m e r g i n gc o u n t r i e s .
As regards the interest rate setting, we ﬁnd evidence that only Mexico has followed the
Taylor principle in recent years, and even so not all the time. Seemingly, although Brazil
and Chile have followed the principle marginally, the remaining countries have carried out
neutral monetary policies with respect to inﬂation. Our results also suggest that, for most
countries, the interest rate setting is symmetric and does not take into account exchange
rate changes or the output gap.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper we examine the way monetary policy has evolved recently in a sample of emerging
economies by using Taylor Rule speciﬁcations. This methodology is intended to characterize
central bank application of monetary policy and verify whether these countries follow the Taylor
principle: central banks facing higher expected inﬂation should raise nominal interest rates by
more than the rise in expected inﬂation. In other words, to test whether central banks follow
the intuitive appeal of increasing real interest rates to ﬁght rising inﬂation.
The expression "Taylor Rule" comes from the seminal work of Taylor (1993). The author
showed that a simple monetary policy rule, where the US Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) raises
the interest rate if inﬂation rate exceeds a two percent implicit target or if real GDP is higher
than potential GDP, describes quite well the actual path of the federal funds rate between 1987
and 1992.
This result led to a plethora of papers on interest rule models and central bank behavior.
Most studies were applied to industrial countries. For instance, Clarida et al. (2000) estimated
a forward-looking monetary policy rule for United States pre- and post- October 1979 - the
beginning of Paul Volcker’s tenure as Fed chairman. They found Taylor rule interest rate
coeﬃcients followed the Taylor principle during the Volcker-Greenspan term but not before
1979. According to them, this result may explain the cause of inﬂation stability in United
States in the early 1980s.
Recently, some authors have paid more attention to Taylor rule speciﬁcations. After
all, which Taylor rule speciﬁcation best describes central bank behavior? Trying to answer this
question, Qin and Enders (2008) compare the in-sample and out-of-sample properties of ﬁve
Taylor rule variants and two simple univariate models of federal funds rate. Unlike Clarida et
al. (2000), they used real-time US quarterly data, those available to the Fed at the moment the
interest rate is set1. Their results hint that a simple forward-looking rule and a nonlinear rule
- one that allows a stronger interest rate response when the interest rate is high than when it is
low - are not only the best ﬁt in-sample models according to Akaike and Bayesian information
criteria, but also the best models in out-of-sample forecasting performance. Furthermore, they
1According to Orphanides (2001), central banks use real-time data instead of ex post data at the point of
decision. Because output and inﬂation series are frequently revised, policy rule estimations based on revised
data may result in misleading descriptions of monetary policy.
2ﬁnd that the Fed followed the Taylor principle before 1979 and during the Volcker-Greenspan
era.
Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008) draw attention to nonlinearities in the US interest rate
reaction functions because of asymmetric central bank preferences. Their more remarkable
ﬁnding shows that the Fed was more reactive to positive than negative inﬂation gaps under
William Martin’s chairmanship (1951-1970), and more reactive to negative than positive output
gaps during Greenspan’s term (1987-2006).
In empirical terms, most of the monetary policy analysis is devoted to evaluating
speciﬁc arrangements like the inﬂation-targeting regime. In this monetary policy set-up the
adoption of the Taylor principle, at least in theory, should be a necessary condition. Kuttner
and Posen (1999), for example, tried to conﬁrm the alleged beneﬁts of the inﬂation-targeting
regime by looking at the behavior of central banks. They estimated an interest rate rule
and impulse response functions for short- and long-term interest rates in pre-targeting and
post-targeting periods for the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. Surprisingly, they
found that for the United Kingdom and Canada the estimated Taylor rule’s inﬂation coeﬃcient
decreased in the post-targeting period.
It could be the case that the conquered credibility of inﬂation target regimes allows for
the adoption of lax monetary policies? Perhaps so, and possibly it is an interesting question to
investigate. Many authors were actually more interested to know if inﬂation targeting works2.
Attention has also been drawn to the behavior of the central bank in emerging economies (see,
for example, Corbo, 2002; Fraga et al., 2003; Minella et al., 2003; Mohanty and Klau (2004)).
The greater diﬃculties faced by these countries compared with industrial ones in achieving price
stability are well known. In spite of conservative monetary policy, expectations of government
debt monetization arising from ﬁscal dominance regimes and higher vulnerability to external
shocks aﬀord low credibility to central banks. As a result, it is diﬃcult to coordinate inﬂation
2Ball and Sheridan (2003), for instance, evaluate inﬂation-targeting eﬀects on average inﬂation, inﬂation
variability, inﬂation persistence, average output growth, output variability and long-term interest rates in OECD
economies and, after controlling mean reversion, do not ﬁnd evidence that inﬂa t i o n - t a r g e t i n gm a k e sad i ﬀerence,
for better or worse. Batini et al. (2005) and Gonçalves and Salles (2008) apply the same methodology for
emerging economies. The former report lower inﬂation and inﬂation variability in targeters compared with
non-targeters, while the latter argue that inﬂation-targeters experience greater declines in inﬂation and output
volatility.
3expectations and hence keep inﬂation low and stable.
As far as we are concerned, the methodology of using forecasting performance to select
Taylor rules was still not used to evaluate monetary policy rules in emerging economies. Our
paper tries to ﬁll this gap and shed more light on understanding monetary policy in emerging
economies. We apply this methodology to a set of emerging economies with similar character-
istics. Speciﬁcally, we investigate monetary policy application in the seven largest economies
in Latin America, the so-called LAC-7 group: Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Colombia,
Venezuela and Peru. Of those, only Argentina and Venezuela were not inﬂation-targeters and
had a ﬂexible exchange rate regime during the 1999-2008 period. This allows us to have a
unique sample of emerging economies with close stages of development and the same oﬃcial
monetary policy framework and exchange rate regime.
For each selected county in our sample, we run eight alternative Taylor rule speciﬁca-
tions and select the one that best predicts the interest rate setting. We test central bank deter-
mination of interest rates by looking at backward and forward rules, reaction and no-reaction
to exchange rate movements and, ﬁnally, look for the presence of asymmetrical behavior de-
pending on inﬂation being above or below the target.
Importantly, our results suggest that the model with higher predictive power varies
widely across countries, from a simple backward-looking rule for Colombia to an asymmetric
forward-looking rule with exchange rate change for Brazil. Summing up our results, we ﬁnd
that: (i) backward-looking rules generally provide better forecasting than forward ones, mean-
i n gt h a tp a s ti n ﬂation still plays a role in inﬂation expectations in emerging economies; (ii) the
Taylor principle is followed by Mexico, although not continuously, but only marginally followed
by Brazil and Chile; (iii) apart from Brazil, where monetary policymakers seem to be more
aggressive to decrease interest rates when inﬂation is below the target rather than to increase
interest rates when it is above target, the interest rate setting across the countries seems to be
symmetric with respect to inﬂation; and (iv) the exchange rate change seems to be a relevant
variable for interest rate decisions only for Peru and Mexico, whereas the output gap appears
to matter just for Colombia and Peru.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the eight models of reaction
functions to be estimated. Section 3 presents the data and methodology. Section 4 shows
the estimated coeﬃcients for all models, compares their in-sample and out-of-sample forecast
4performance and presents the rolling regression coeﬃcients from the best-ﬁtting model for each
country. The last section sets out our conclusions, limitations and the motivational next steps
of this study.
2M o d e l s
We run eight Taylor rules for the LAC-7 and use forecast performance to select the best-ﬁt
model for each country. In this section we will display all interest rule speciﬁcations. Model 1
is a simple backward-looking Taylor rule:
it = α + ρit−1 + γπ(πt−1 − π∗
t)+γyyt−1 + εt (2.1)
where it is the nominal short-term interest rate, πt−1 is the accumulated twelve-month inﬂation
rate at time t − 1, π∗
t is the inﬂation targeting at time t for the next twelve months, and yt−1
is the output gap at time t - 1. The lagged interest rate term is included to take into account
interest rate smoothing3. Model 2 is our simplest forward-looking Taylor rule:
it = α + ρit−1 + γπ(Et πt+12 − π∗
t)+γyEt yt+12 + εt (2.2)
Here Et πt−12 is the expected accumulated inﬂation rate for the next twelve months at time
t- 1a n dEt yt+12 is the output gap for twelve months ahead. Qin and Enders (2008) claim
that empirical studies on industrial countries usually show that forward-looking models have
better ﬁt than backward ones. For Clarida et al. (2000), simple forward-looking models have
presented a good empirical description of major central banks’ behavior, at least in recent years.
Although it seems that forward-looking models may describe monetary policy better than
backward-looking models in developed economies, there is some evidence that past inﬂation
still inﬂuences the expectations in emerging economies, owing to imperfect credibility. Minella
3Sack and Wieland (1999) show evidence that interest rate smoothing is a common practice of central banks
in developed economies, and explain such behavior by forward-looking expectations, uncertainty concerning data
on output and inﬂation and uncertainty about the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The signaling of
further adjustments in the short-term rate moves future short-term rates and market long-term rates, powering
the eﬀects of monetary policy. Frequent revisions on output and inﬂation data may induce milder reactions at
the time data are released, and uncertainty about the transmission mechanism can make the gradual adjustment
of short-term rates desirable to avoid unnecessary movements in output and inﬂation. Fear of reputation losses
caused by interest rate reversals can also lead to gradualism.
5et al. (2003), for instance, report OLS estimations showing that the market-expected inﬂation
in Brazil depended on past inﬂation during the 2000-2003 period. They argue that this ﬁnding
is explained by the perception that, given the private agents’ uncertainty about the monetary
policy to be followed by the newly-elected government, the inﬂationary eﬀects derived from
the conﬁdence crisis at the end of 2002 could be more persistent. Additionally, Mohanty and
Klau (2004) state that a forward-looking model estimated for emerging economies normally
shows lower explanatory power than their baseline model, a within-quarter Taylor rule where
the interest rate reacts to the actual inﬂation rate.
Given the probable role of the exchange rate in emerging economies’ interest rate setting,
models 3 and 4 add the exchange rate change at time t, ∆st, to our original speciﬁcations.
Model 3 is therefore a backward-looking Taylor rule with exchange rate change:
it = α + ρit−1 + γπ(πt−1 − π∗
t)+γyyt−1 + γs∆st + εt (2.3)
and model 4 is a forward-looking Taylor rule with exchange rate change:
it = α + ρit−1 + γπ(Et πt+12 − π∗
t)+γyEt yt+12 + γs∆st + εt (2.4)
The speciﬁcations above suppose that central bank reactions are the same regardless of the
sign of the inﬂation gap. Some authors have claimed that central banks’ reaction is asymmetric,
depending on the inﬂation level being above or below the target level. Surico (2004), for
instance, raises the possibility that political pressures may induce greater monetary policy
reactions in periods of poor economic performance. Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008), on
the other hand, also claim that monetary policymakers intending to build credibility may
be more averse to positive than negative inﬂation gaps of equal size. In order to test the
presence of asymmetric monetary policy - and identify the type of asymmetry - we added in
the models 1 to 4 a dummy variable for inﬂation levels below the target levels. In the case of
backward-looking models, the dummy variable Dπ is equal to one if the accumulated tweve-
month inﬂation rate at time t -1 is lower than the target level, (πt−1 − π∗
t) < 0, and has the
value 0 otherwise. For the forward-looking models, the dummy variable Dπ is equal to one if
the expected accumulated inﬂation rate for the next twelve months at time t -1 is lower than
the target level, (Et πt+12 − π∗
t) < 0, and equal to 0 otherwise. Thus, models 5 and 6 are the
ﬁrst two models augmented by the dummy variable:




6it = α + ρit−1 + γπ(Et πt+12 − π∗
t)+γyEt yt+12 + γ∗
πDπ(Et πt+12 − π∗
t)+εt (2.6)
while models 7 and 8 are, respectively, the simple backward and forward-looking rules including
the dummy variable and the exchange rate change:
it = α + ρit−1 + γπ(πt−1 − π∗
t)+γyyt−1 + γs∆st + γ∗
πDπ(πt−1 − π∗
t)+εt (2.7)
it = α + ρit−1 + γπ(Et πt+12 − π∗
t)+γyEt yt+12 + γs∆st + γ∗
πDπ(Et πt+12 − π∗
t)+εt (2.8)
The Taylor principle states that the long-run interest rate response to inﬂation rate in-





where we used the notation δx as the long-run response of interest rates to the variable x.A
coeﬃcient greater than one means that the central bank increases the target nominal interest
rate by more than the rise in expected inﬂation. The consequent rise in real interest rate
stabilizes inﬂation since it tends to lower aggregate demand and inﬂation expectations. A
coeﬃcient less than one tends to lead to a higher inﬂation since it implies smaller real interest
rates in response to higher expected inﬂation and, therefore, further increases in inﬂation
expectations.
For the coeﬃcients on the interest rate long-run responses to output gap and exchange rate,










The next section details the data which were used and describes the methodology followed
to select the most appropriate model for each country.
3 Data and Methodology
We used monthly data ranging from January 1999 to January 2008 obtained from DataStream.
For Brazil, Mexico and Colombia starting dates were slightly diﬀerent in order to represent
7the correct starting dates of the inﬂation targeting regime: we used June 1999 for the ﬁrst
two and September 1999 for the third. Additional information, such as the monetary policy
regime description, monetary policy target interest rate and the announced inﬂation targets,
was obtained from the respective central banks’ home pages. The short-term interest rates,
it, for Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Peru were the money market inter-bank short-term
interest rate; for Brazil, we used the overnight SELIC rate; for Chile, the monetary policy
interest rate; and for Venezuela the commercial bank deposit rate.
Inﬂation, πt, is a twelve-month moving average of the consumer price index for each country.
Inﬂation targets for the next twelve-month period, π∗
t, for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and
Peru were computed as a weighted average of current year and next year targets. For each data
point the weights are proportional to the number of months the current year and the next year
have in the next twelve-month period. For Argentina and Venezuela, which are not inﬂation-
targeters, we estimated a threshold inﬂation level, given by the average inﬂation rate during
the period 1999-2008. This last assumption is innocuous since a constant inﬂation target could
easily be incorporated in the constant, α,o ft h em o d e l s1 - 8 .
The expected accumulated inﬂation rate for the next twelve months at time t−1, Et πt+12,
was computed with the Consensus Economic Forecast survey of market expectations for each
country. Since we have current year and next year forecasts only, for each data point we
computed a weighted average of these two series, as we did for inﬂation targets. The output
gap, yt, was computed with an HP ﬁlter on the seasonally-adjusted industrial production series
for each country. For the expected output gap twelve months ahead, Et yt+12,w eﬁrst computed
the expected seasonally-adjusted industrial production index for the next twelve months using
current year and next year expected industrial productions from the Consensus Economic
Forecast survey. Similarly, to the expected accumulated inﬂation target, the twelve-month
ahead series is a weighted average of current and next year forecasts. We then used an HP
ﬁlter in the expected industrial production series in order to obtain the expected output gap
series. Nominal exchange rates, st, are the spot exchange rates of each country with respect to
the US dollar.
The estimation methodology used three steps: forecasting using rolling regressions; in-
sample estimation of the models using the full-sample; and recursive computation of the long-
run interest rate responses to inﬂation and output gap. For the forecasting analysis, we followed
8the mean correction error methodology used by Cheung at al. (2005) in their study of exchange
rate predictability. First, we estimated the Taylor speciﬁcations of models 1-8, nested in the
following equation:
it = α + ΓXt + εt (3.1)
where Γ is a vector of parameters and Xt is a vector of the macroeconomic variables used in
models 1-8, Xt =[ it−1,πt−1−π∗
t,y t−1,E t (πt+12−π∗
t),E t yt+12,4st,D π(πt−1−π∗
t),D π(Et πt+12−
π∗
t)]0. Equation (3.1) was estimated by OLS with Newey-West robust standard errors. From
the estimated coeﬃcients, [ˆ α, ˆ Γ] of each of the restricted models (2.1) to (2.8), we estimate the
following mean correction equation:
it+k − it = φ(it − ˆ ΓXt)+ut (3.2)
The forecast horizon is given by the parameter k. In our exercise, forecast horizons are
of one month, three months and six months ahead, k =1 ,3,6. Equation (3.2) is similar to
a vector error correction model stripped from its short-run dynamics. The reason for using
(3.2) instead of (3.1) to forecast interest rates is that we want true ex ante forecasts. Since we
do not know the future values of the macroeconomic variables, we do not know at time t the
value of Xt+k in order to forecast it+k. Estimated adjustment parameter, ˆ φ, of equation (3.2)
is therefore used to forecast future values of the interest rates.
Forecasting is done according to rolling regressions on (3.1) and (3.2). First we divide the
t o t a ls a m p l eo fs i z eT into two subsets: one for estimation, and the other for forecasting. The
estimation sub-sample has a ﬁxed size of D with T<D . Using data up to observation D,w e
ﬁrst estimate the interest rate mean correction model, equations (3.1) and (3.2), and we obtain
one-, three- and six-month exchange rate predictions for each Taylor rule model 1-8. Next, we
displace the estimation sample one period ahead, to t =2to t = D +1 , keeping the size of
the initial sample ﬁxed on D observations. Again, we predict the interest rates for forecasts
for one, three and six months ahead. We repeat this procedure until the sample is exhausted.
In the end, for each model, we will have a series of interest rate predictions.
To rank forecasts, we compare the predicted series in each model (2.1) to (2.8) with the
random-walk naive speciﬁcation that assumes it+k = it. Comparison is then made by use of
the Clark and West (2006, 2007) statistic which is computed as the mean of the diﬀerence of
the squared forecasting errors between the random-walk benchmark and the Taylor rule speci-
9ﬁcation model. Using the fact that the Clark and West (2006, 2007) statistic is asymptotically
normal, we specify a signiﬁcance one-sided test where the null assumes that the statistic is not
positive. Rejection of the null implies that we fail to reject that the Taylor rule speciﬁcation
has a better forecasting power than the random-walk benchmark. For each country, we deﬁne
the best model in terms of forecasting accuracy in accordance with the following sequential
criteria: (1) higher number of horizons where the null is rejected; (2) lowest mean signiﬁcance
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels; and (3) higher mean of t-values for the Clark and West statistics
for the three horizons.
In-sample estimation is done by running OLS equations on speciﬁcations (2.1) to (2.8) using
Newey-West standard robust errors. Long-run interest rate response coeﬃcients were obtained
directly from estimated coeﬃcients using equations (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11). Since they are
functions of estimated coeﬃcients, standard errors and conﬁdence intervals were constructed
by the delta method. Recursive estimation of the coeﬃcients used the same rolling regression
technique of the forecasting exercise with a ﬁxed window of 72 observations for Argentina,
Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela and 80 observations for Brazil and Mexico. For each
rolling regression, long-run coeﬃcients were computed in the same way as they were for the
full-sample estimation.
4R e s u l t s
Table 1 reports the Clark-West statistics and t values for each model and each country for three
forecast horizons: one, three and six months. The highlights indicate the best model according
to our sequential criteria. Table 1.b presents Akaike information criteria (AIC) and Schwarz
information criteria (SIC) for each model and country, highlighting the smallest values. The
ﬁrst two countries, Argentina and Venezuela, do not have an inﬂation-targeting regime in place.
All the remaining countries are inﬂation-targeters.
Comparing Tables 1 and 1.b we can see that in-sample and out-of-sample measures of
performance select diﬀerent policy rule speciﬁcations for most countries. The model displaying
better forecasting performance generally is not the model with better in-sample performance.
Furthermore, Akaike and Schwarz criteria pick up diﬀerent models for Brazil and Mexico.
Given the absence of single solutions using in-sample criteria and the diﬀerent judgments of
10the in-sample and out-of-sample measures, the choice of the best model in terms of forecasting
performance seemed to us the most appropriate one. We judge that is better to pick the model
that best predicts the interest rate decisions of the monetary authority since it reﬂects how the
monetary policy will be conducted. Hence, our conclusions hereafter are based on the model
that has the best forecasting performance.
Table 1 shows that the model providing the best forecast varies widely across countries,
and there is no dominant one. Nevertheless, there is a slight dominance of backward-looking
models. Whereas Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela seem to set interest rates on a forward-
looking basis, the backward-looking models show better forecasting performance for Chile,
Colombia, Mexico and Peru, hinting that past inﬂation still plays a role in inﬂation expectations
in emerging economies. This diﬀerence increases in the sample of inﬂation-targeting countries:
for all of them except Brazil, backward rules have greater predictive power than forward ones.
Furthermore, we identiﬁed asymmetric interest-setting behavior for Brazil, Peru and Venezuela,
although in the last two countries the asymmetry is not so clear since the models have low
predictive power.
The full-sample long-run interest rate responses to inﬂation are presented in Table 2, with
best models in terms of forecasting performance appearing in shaded text. Our results indi-
cate that the Taylor principle is followed by Mexico (the point estimate is statistically higher
than one at 5% level), suggesting monetary policy in line with the inﬂation-targeting strat-
egy, but only marginally followed by Brazil and Chile (point estimates higher than one but
90% conﬁdence intervals including values smaller than one). Although model 3 indicated that
Mexico seemingly followed the Taylor principle over the 1999-2007 period, recursive conﬁdence
intervals will make it clear that the principle was not followed all the time. As regards the
asymmetric interest-setting in Brazil, monetary policymakers seem to be more aggressive to
loosen monetary policy when inﬂation is below the target than to tight monetary policy when
it is above target, a kind of asymmetry typically stemming from political pressures. Mone-
tary policy carried out in Argentina, Venezuela, Peru and Colombia does not seem to be in
accordance with the Taylor principle. A noteworthy result for Brazil, Chile and Colombia is
that even models with performance closer to the best forecasting model (models with an equal
number of stars summing up the three horizons, but with smaller mean of t-values) point to
the same conclusions suggested by the best forecasting model.
11Fig.1 shows the estimated rolling regression long-run interest rate responses to inﬂation
together with dashed lines representing a 90% conﬁdence interval. The straight dashed line at
value one is used as the reference value for the Taylor principle. For Brazil, the graph represents
only coeﬃcients for inﬂation above target, once we identify an asymmetric monetary policy.
The increasing long-run inﬂation coeﬃcient for Brazil means the central bank has increased
the interest rate response when expected inﬂation is higher than the target rate, that is, it
has adopted an increasingly tighter monetary policy (nearly following the Taylor principle in
the last period). Chile and Mexico were also increasingly strengthening monetary policy but
reversed this trend in the last periods. As the full-sample point estimates reveal, the remaining
countries apparently carry out neutral monetary policies with respect to inﬂation.
Table 3 shows long-run interest rate responses to output gap, computed from equation
(2.10). Shaded areas once more indicate values from the best forecasting model. The level
of economic activity seems to matter for monetary policy only in Peru and Colombia. The
estimated rolling regressions in Fig. 2 show the 90% conﬁdence interval of the long-run output
gap responses above zero most of the time for Colombia. This eﬀect is less pronounced for
Peru, once the conﬁdence interval includes the zero value during some periods. According to
the results stated in Table 4, computed using equation (2.11), the exchange rate changes seem
to matter just for Mexico and Peru.
Finally, our results allow us to divide the full sample of countries into three groups. The ﬁrst
one includes Brazil, Chile and Mexico, whose monetary policy is seemingly neutral to output
gap but not neutral to inﬂation. Monetary policy in Colombia and Peru seems to be just
the opposite: neutral with respect to inﬂation but not to the output gap. For Argentina and
Venezuela, monetary policy appears to be neutral to both variables, which is not particularly
surprising, since those two countries are the only ones in the LAC-7 that do not adopt an
inﬂation-targeting regime.
5 Conclusions, limitations anf future extensions
In this paper we seek to describe the way monetary policy was conducted in the seven largest
economies of Latin America, the LAC-7 group, over the January 1999 to January 2008 period.
We ran eight alternative functional forms of the Taylor Rule for each country and selected
12the most appropriate Taylor rule speciﬁcation using out-of-sample measures of forecasting
performance. According to our results, the best model in terms of predictive power varies
widely across countries, and backward-looking rules slightly outperform forward-looking ones
in forecasting interest rates. This latter result hints that past inﬂation is still an important
determinant of expected inﬂa t i o ni ne m e r g i n ge c o n o m i e s .
Analyzing the application of monetary policy within the LAC-7 group, we were able to
distinguish three groups. Mexico, Brazil and Chile seem to be more concerned with inﬂation
and show empirical evidence in favor of the Taylor principle adoption. Our evidence shows that
only Mexico has followed the Taylor principle in recent years, but not continuously. Brazil and
Chile have followed the principle marginally. For a second group, Peru and Colombia, interest
rate setting is more aﬀected by the output gap than by past or expected inﬂation rates. Finally,
Argentina and Venezuela, which are the only countries within LAC-7 not following inﬂation
targeting, adopt very loose monetary policies.
Compared with the Qin and Enders (2008) methodology, our paper adds to the literature
by comparing a large set of countries and using improved forecasting techniques. Predictability
is tested against a random-walk benchmark using a mean error-correction model and statistical
signiﬁcance is tested with Clark and West (2006, 2007) statistics. When it comes to testing fore-
casting performance, those are well-established techniques in the exchange rate determination
literature (see, for instance, Mark et al., 2007).
One limitation, owing to data unavailability for the LAC-7 group, is that we do not use
real-time data, as Qin and Enders (2008) do for their US estimations. Future studies should
aim to build databases which reﬂect the information central banks have at the time they decide
the interest rate policy. In our view, however, the lack of real-time data does not compromise
our results, since we are interested in central bank behavior comparisons across the LAC-7
group. Other possible extensions, motivated by nonlinear studies like those of Cukierman and
Muscatelli (2008), could also employ alternative model speciﬁcations to capture nonlinearities.
In conclusion, we strongly believe that this study brings objective techniques to the compar-
ison and analysis of monetary policy in emerging economies. Instead of looking at the results
of monetary policy, which cannot be isolated from other external factors like price shocks, ex-
ternal demand conditions and so on, we look at how central banks do their job. We think this
is a promising way of understanding monetary policy.
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Table 1 - Forecasting evaluation - Clark and West (2006, 2007) Statistics 
Country Horizon Back Forward Back/XR Fwd./XR Back/Asym. Fwd./Asym Back/XR/Asym Fwd./XR/Asym
ARG 1-month Statisitc 0,813 ** 0,823 ** 0,834 ** 0,877 ** 0,638 ** 0,337   0,647 ** 0,391  
t-value (1,991) (1,746) (1,883) (1,815) (1,872) (0,768) (1,713) (0,641)
3-month Statisitc 3,765   6,759 * 3,845   7,026 ** 2,994   1,385   3,072   1,328  
t-value (1,239) (1,643) (1,156) (1,672) (1,249) (0,639) (1,1) (0,495)
6-month Statisitc 6,321   8,339   6,758   8,409   5,294 * 1,357   5,708 * 0,936  
t-value (1,265) (1,029) (1,265) (1,041) (1,396) (0,378) (1,358) (0,242)
VEZ 1-month Statisitc 0,017   0,013   0,017   0,013   0,007   0,021  0,007   0,021  
t-value (0,815) (0,822) (0,851) (0,903) (0,239) (1,074) (0,243) (1,163)
3-month Statisitc 0,052   0,023   0,058   0,027   0,014   0,059  0,027   0,061  
t-value (0,467) (0,358) (0,515) (0,414) (0,128) (0,672) (0,239) (0,686)
6-month Statisitc 0,164   0,098   0,193   0,120   -0,163   0,243  -0,106   0,250  
t-value (0,315) (0,268) (0,351) (0,299) (-0,343) (0,499) (-0,242) (0,486)
BRA 1-month Statisitc 2,464 *** 3,283 *** 2,495 *** 3,307 *** 2,698 *** 3,671 *** 2,716 *** 3,691 ***
t-value (2,906) (2,957) (2,926) (2,976) (3,096) (3,723) (3,101) (3,74)
3-month Statisitc 0,762   1,256   0,780   1,260   0,514   2,435 ** 0,500   2,426 **
t-value (0,75) (0,709) (0,79) (0,718) (0,695) (2,151) (0,68) (2,157)
6-month Statisitc 2,521   3,047   2,584   3,159   2,390   5,960 *** 2,254   6,011 ***
t-value (0,847) (0,56) (0,877) (0,584) (0,891) (3,693) (0,854) (3,687)
CHI 1-month Statisitc -0,001   0,000   0,000   0,000   -0,001   0,000   -0,001   0,000  
t-value (-0,264) (-0,141) (-0,16) (0,13) (-0,58) (-0,079) (-0,491) (0,117)
3-month Statisitc 0,004 ** 0,000   0,005 ** 0,002   0,001 * 0,002   0,002 ** 0,003  
t-value (2,255) (-0,052) (2,145) (0,565) (1,577) (0,418) (1,945) (0,922)
6-month Statisitc -0,018   -0,018   -0,016   -0,011   -0,023   -0,014   -0,022   -0,007  
t-value (-2,046) (-0,933) (-1,915) (-0,55) (-2,842) (-0,694) (-2,826) (-0,33)
   17
Table 1 - Forecasting evaluation - Clark and West (2006, 2007) Statistics - continuation
Country Horizon Back Forward Back/XR Fwd./XR Back/Asym. Fwd./Asym Back/XR/Asym Fwd./XR/Asym
COL 1-month Statisitc 0,003 ** 0,007 ** 0,003 ** 0,007 *** 0,000   0,008 ** 0,000   0,007 **
t-value (2,04) (2,219) (2,218) (2,406) (0,017) (2,206) (0,033) (2,318)
3-month Statisitc 0,043 *** 0,050 ** 0,035 *** 0,046 ** -0,006   0,015   -0,005   0,005  
t-value (4,399) (2,321) (3,995) (2,171) (-2,031) (0,778) (-1,718) (0,304)
6-month Statisitc 0,042 * 0,002   0,035 * 0,011   -0,030   -0,054   -0,026   -0,071  
t-value (1,526) (0,013) (1,439) (0,092) (-2,99) (-0,65) (-2,514) (-0,967)
MEX 1-month Statisitc -0,002   -0,001   0,001   0,002 * 0,000   -0,001   -0,001   0,002  
t-value (-2,326) (-1,007) (0,878) (1,424) (0,703) (-1,318) (-0,586) (1,093)
3-month Statisitc 0,007   -0,008   0,015 ** 0,000   0,008   0,000   0,001 ** 0,009  
t-value (1,199) (-1,048) (2,324) (0,024) (1,072) (0,017) (1,661) (1,018)
6-month Statisitc 0,027 *** -0,002   0,021 *** -0,009   0,024 *** 0,027 *** 0,021 *** 0,021 ***
t-value (10,405) (-0,456) (4,239) (-1,378) (7,313) (5,757) (4,76) (4,369)
PER 1-month Statisitc -0,005   -0,008   -0,004   -0,009   -0,003   -0,010   0,001   -0,012  
t-value (-1,011) (-2,097) (-0,496) (-1,092) (-0,558) (-2,179) (0,07) (-1,333)
3-month Statisitc -0,035   -0,083   -0,018   -0,060   0,032   -0,100   0,038   -0,089  
t-value (-1,195) (-2,032) (-0,189) (-0,982) (0,931) (-4,224) (0,425) (-1,413)
6-month Statisitc -0,008   -0,158   0,216   0,043   -0,035   -0,092   0,094   0,052  
t-value (-0,048) (-1,001) (1,004) (0,294) (-0,198) (-0,919) (0,494) (0,464)
Note: The Clark and West (2006, 2007) statistic is computed as the mean of the difference of the squared forecasting errors between the random-walk benchmark and the Taylor rule specification model. For 
a one-sided test where the null assumes that the statistic is not positive, the number of stars following the statistic, ***, ** and * means rejection of the null at 99%, 95% and 90% levels. Rejection of the null 
implies that we fail to reject that the Taylor rule specification has a better forecasting power than the random-walk benchmark. Highlighted values represent the best selected model using the following 
sequential criteria: (1) higher number of horizons where the null is rejected; (2) lowest mean significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% (number of stars summing the three horizons) and (3) higher mean of t-
values for the three horizons.    18
Table 1.b - In-sample AIC and SIC
Country Best Best
AIC SIC AIC SIC AIC SIC AIC SIC AIC SIC AIC SIC AIC SIC AIC
Argentina 7,488 7,612 7,554 7,653 7,550 7,649 7,570 7,694 7,560 7,685 7,663 7,797 7,488 7,612 7,684
Venzuela 4,831 4,931 4,831 4,931 4,855 4,954 4,850 4,974 4,873 4,998 4,909 5,042 4,870 4,995 4,929
Brazil 4,061 4,175 4,198 4,300 4,073 4,175 4,218 4,345 4,092 4,220 4,228 4,361 4,061 4,188 4,248
Chile 0,640 0,740 0,772 0,872 0,640 0,740 0,787 0,912 0,646 0,770 0,848 0,982 0,656 0,780 0,865
Colombia 1,410 1,543 2,119 2,222 2,154 2,258 2,138 2,268 2,172 2,302 1,410 1,543 2,110 2,239 1,427
Mexico 2,341 2,489 2,430 2,532 2,387 2,489 2,416 2,543 2,380 2,507 2,371 2,504 2,362 2,489 2,343
Peru 3,472 3,633 4,197 4,297 4,137 4,236 4,076 4,200 4,048 4,172 3,507 3,641 4,062 4,186 3,472
Note: The table presents values for the in-sample criteria of the models, highlighted values represent the selected model in terms of having the best in-sample AIC and SIC values.
Back Forward Back/XR Fwd./XR Back/Asym. Fwd./Asym Back/XR
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Table 2 - Interest rate long run response to inflation 
Country Back Forward Back/XR Fwd./XR When inflation is... Back/Asym. Fwd./Asym Back/XR/Asym Fwd./XR/Asym
Argentina -0,676 *** 0,020  -0,530   0,002   above target -0,526  0,511   -0,489  0,487  
(0,233584) (0,440951) (0,489732) (0,426763) (0,463407) (0,32732) (0,466846) (0,306268)
below target -1,745 * -1,809 *** -1,727  -1,774 ***
(1,038707) (0,641791) (1,166485) (0,684597)
Venezuela -0,708  -0,020  -0,712   -0,022   above target 0,287  -0,198   0,302  -0,198  
(0,875507) (0,245323) (0,89575) (0,241491) (1,207322) (0,369146) (1,262758) (0,374188)
below target -2,495  0,616   -2,559  0,615  
(3,59848) (0,660565) (3,847866) (0,658686)
Brazil 0,587 *** 1,589 *** 0,586 *** 1,590 *** above target 0,612 *** 1,267 *** 0,611 *** 1,268 ***
(0,161917) (0,260847) (0,165224) (0,26054) (0,167201) (0,180188) (0,169216) (0,179346)
below target 1,186658 * 4,948763 *** 1,188838 * 4,944585 ***
(0,703076) (1,440283) (0,707709) (1,468536)
Chile 1,015 *** 3,421 *** 1,027 *** 3,570 *** above target 0,473  2,902 *** 0,441  2,895 ***
(0,209821) (0,655703) (0,219366) (0,754939) (0,552712) (0,885203) (0,629728) (0,964971)
below target 1,720 *** 4,182 *** 1,768 ** 4,568 ***
(0,586208) (1,009342) (0,693592) (1,335961)
Colombia 0,471  0,749  0,463   0,794   above target 5,771  3,284 *** 4,949  3,330 ***
(0,52443) (0,783809) (0,523913) (0,767084) (7,956893) (1,033461) (6,277037) (1,027042)
below target -12,227  -3,976 *** -10,904  -3,934 ***
(19,52254) (1,483556) (16,25746) (1,484907)
Mexico 2,984 *** 9,985 *** 2,960 *** 9,597 *** above target 2,220 ** 11,493 *** 1,783 * 11,153 ***
(0,767365) (3,17245) (0,722745) (3,12019) (1,07946) (2,760731) (1,030303) (2,67717)
below target 5,795 *** -129,429 *** 5,645 *** -137,638 **
(1,806423) (47,874) (1,606064) (56,46184)
Peru 0,397  8,069 *** 2,010   7,403 *** above target -2,306 ** 13,516 *** -1,318  12,548 ***
(1,334267) (2,717274) (1,251825) (2,653695) (0,951295) (2,40469) (0,862202) (2,628154)
below target 2,086 ** -5,948 *** 2,228 ** -4,704 **
(0,893786) (1,853463) (0,90278) (1,987591)
Note: The table presents long-run interest rate responses according to equation (3.9), values in parentheses are standard values, the number of stars following the long-run coefficient values, ***, ** and * means statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Highlighted values represent the selected model in terms of having the best forecasting performance.  
 
   20
 
Table 3 - Interest rate long run response to output gap 
Country
Argentina -2,967 * -1,567 ** -2,459  -1,310   -3,519 ** -1,029 * -3,405 * -0,877  
(1,617) (0,784) (1,788) (1,063) (1,636) (0,625) (1,908) (0,831)
Venezuela 0,016  -0,035  0,015   -0,037   0,252  -0,051   0,253   -0,052  
(0,266) (0,128) (0,264) (0,135) (0,602) (0,129) (0,617) (0,135)
Brazil -0,071  -0,031   -0,070   -0,033   -0,076  -0,164   -0,074   -0,164  
(0,208) (0,148) (0,205) (0,148) (0,23) (0,12) (0,229) (0,12)
Chile 0,234  0,327 *** 0,248   0,384 *** 0,154  0,316 *** 0,164   0,371 ***
(0,175) (0,107) (0,181) (0,127) (0,185) (0,108) (0,186) (0,126)
Colombia 0,483 ** 0,201  0,480 ** 0,194   2,242   0,121   2,020   0,114  
(0,225) (0,168) (0,223) (0,167) (2,737) (0,13) (2,253) (0,129)
Mexico 1,164  1,314 * 1,189   1,293 * 0,834 * 1,134 * 0,789 * 1,101 *
(0,809) (0,733) (0,743) (0,698) (0,506) (0,664) (0,417) (0,621)
Peru 0,571 * 0,256  0,729 * 0,320   0,405 * 0,207   0,455 * 0,246  
(0,299) (0,285) (0,382) (0,324) (0,222) (0,181) (0,254) (0,219)
Note: The table presents long-run interest rate responses according to equation (3.10), values in parentheses are standard values, the number of stars following the long-run coefficient 
values, ***, ** and * means statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Highlighted values represent the selected model in terms of having the best forecasting 
performance.
     Back Forward Back/XR Fwd./XR Back/Asym. Fwd./Asym Back/XR/Asym Fwd./XR/Asym  21
Table 4 - Interest rate long-run responses to exchange rate changes
Country
Argentina 21,009  25,944   4,012   16,767  
(61,91) (40,532) (60,035) (30,633)
Venezuela -0,964  -0,804   -3,756   -0,073  
(9,154) (6,752) (15,256) (7,019)
Brazil -0,273  0,498   -0,438   0,089  
(5,755) (4,039) (4,639) (4,003)
Chile -0,124  -0,204   -0,130   -0,208  
(0,31) (0,261) (0,317) (0,256)
Colombia -0,001  -0,003   -0,019   -0,003  
(0,006) (0,006) (0,028) (0,004)
Mexico -10,238 ** -11,483 ** -8,186 ** -12,584 **
(4,228) (5,713) (3,366) (5,369)
Peru 232,610  99,341 ** 63,186 * 52,075  
(149,893) (49,417) (37,278) (31,948)
Note: The table presents long-run interest rate responses according to equation (3.11), values 
in parentheses are standard values, the number of stars following the long-run coefficient 
values, ***, ** and * means statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Highlighted values represent the selected model in terms of having the best forecasting 
performance.
Back/XR Fwd./XR Back/XR/Asym Fwd./XR/Asym
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Note: Long-run inflation coefficients were computed according to equation (3.9). The solid line represents the 
estimated coefficients and the dashed lines are 90% confidence interval bands. The straight dashed line at value 
one is used as the reference value for the Taylor Principle. For each country we selected the best forecasting 
performance model according to Table 1. In the case of Brazil, Venezuela and Peru the graphs represent only the 
coefficients for inflation above the target. We used rolling regression with a fixed window of 72 months for 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. For Mexico and Brazil, in order to avoid near singularity 
matrix, we used a window of 80 months.   23
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Note: Long-run output gap coefficients were computed according to equation (3.10). The solid line represents 
the estimated coefficients and the dashed lines are 90% confidence interval bands. The straight dashed line at 
value zero is used as the reference value for positive significance. For each country we selected the best 
forecasting performance model according to Table 1. We used rolling regression with a fixed window of 72 
months for Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. For Mexico and Brazil, in order to avoid near 
singularity matrix, we used a window of 80 months.  